In this paper, the author has analysed the perspectives of Macedonia's new foreign policy concept regarding its neighbours since the second half of 2017. Therefore, he points to Macedonia's numerous bilateral issues, primarily about its name with neighbouring Greece. The paper also includes a review of other open issues with Bulgaria and Albania, which jeopardize its path towards the EU and NATO membership.
During the second half of the Second World War, on 2 August 1944 (the religious holiday Ilinden), the Anti-fascist Sobranie for the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) was formed in the monastery of Sveti Prohor Pčinjski, re-affirming the ethnic and linguistic specificity of Macedonia as well as the status of the constituent element within the framework of the future However, during this period emerged significant antagonisms with the Yugoslav neighbours about the identity issues of the Macedonians. Namely, since the constitution of ASNOM, Greece has denied Macedonia's right to use the term of the Macedonia geographic region and attempts to link the history of Slovenian Macedonians with the legacy of ancient/Hellenic Macedonia. (Gavranov, Stojković 1972: 215-216 ) Also, neighbouring Bulgaria denied the existence of Macedonian ethnicity and the Macedonian language, considering that it was de facto Bulgarian ethnicity, as well as one Bulgarian dialect.
Until the Second World War, Serbian civil circles were not inclined to recognize Macedonian ethnicity, using the term "Old/South Serbia" for this part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. (Jančeva, Litovski 2017: 151) However, due to the anti-fascist struggle and the victory of the anti-fascist forces in Serbia, which have advocated the federal organization of Yugoslavia and the equality of its peoples, the official Serbian communist party and republican structures accepted this principle. It also implied the recognition of the Macedonians as a nation, Croatian International Relations Review -CIRR -XXV (85) 2019, as well as the Macedonian language. However, some Serbian nationalist dissident circles and part of the general public had reservations. Especially after the declaration of the autocephaly of the Archbishopric of Ohrid or the Macedonian Orthodox Church on 19 July 1967, which was part of the Serbian Orthodox Church. (Đorđević, 2005) Since then, this issue between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Macedonian Orthodox Church has not only been broadly transposed to the relations of both Serbs and Macedonians, but also to the relations between Serbia and Macedonia. (ibid.)
Macedonian Independence since 1991 and newly expressed Problems with Neighbours
On the eve of the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia embarked on the realization of its independence in extremely challenging conditions. Despite particular initiatives coming from this southernmost Yugoslav republic to preserve and transform the federal state through the asymmetrical federation, it, however, declared its independence in a referendum on 8 September 1991. (Katz 2014: 191-210) Thus, Macedonia was again in a tough hard position, given the numerous oppositions from its neighbours, but without the former Yugoslav "protective umbrella". (Jančeva, Litovski 2017: 166-167) Bulgaria was the first country to recognize Macedonia's independence (15 January 1992); however, the recognition of Macedonian ethnicity and language did not follow. (MFA) Thus, it significantly reflected the relations between the two countries and different interpretations of specific periods of their history, which, when it comes to neighbouring Macedonia, Bulgaria considered for its own. The tensions mentioned above were frequent, but Bulgaria has managed to strengthen its influence during this and previous decade by granting scholarships to Macedonian students, but also citizenship to its citizens. (B92 2006) Nevertheless, in general, the Bulgarian-Macedonian bilateral relations were rather bad, which threatened that Bulgaria would exercise the right to block Macedonia's accession to NATO and the European Union.
Greece de facto did not recognize Macedonia following the Interim Accord until 13 September 1995. (Interim Accord 1995) However, these relations were at the level of the liaison offices, and since 2004 they were conducted through consular offices in Bitola and Thessaloniki. (ibid.: Article 1) On the other hand, Greece has consistently disputed the right to use the term Macedonia, but also the use of specific national and state symbols. Namely, the "Vergina Sun" displayed on the first flag of independent Macedonia had to be replaced in 1995 with a redesigned flag. (Kornfein 2013: 83) Also, under the United Nations system, the name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" was used for this country. (ibid.: 80) Greece has been persisting with this for more than two and a half decades, conditioning with this issue Macedonia's accession to the European Union (since the end of 2005), and later to NATO (since 2008). Despite significant US influence on the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, Greece did not allow Macedonia to join this alliance under its constitutional name.
In this respect, Macedonia has filed a lawsuit in the International Court of Justice concerning the alleged violations of the Interim Accord. (MFAa) At the end of 2011, this court ruled that Greece had violated the Interim Accord. (ibid.) The official Athena, therefore, has been highly successful in utilizing the potentials for conditioning Macedonia on the path towards full membership in NATO and the EU. Macedonia was thus left on the verge of Euro-Atlantic processes, but also led to the strengthening of conservative and nationalistic political options and forces. Also, Greece and its church did not recognize the Macedonian Orthodox Church, and it should be noted that after the Second World War, a significant part of Slovenian Macedonians was forced to leave today's Aegean Macedonia. (Gavranov, Stojković 1972: 215) Macedonia and Albania established diplomatic relations in April 1992, and these were mostly related to the status of the Albanians settled in the western parts of Macedonia. (MFAb) Namely, even during the first decade of Macedonian independence, ideas to federalize the state through the creation of two monoethnic entities (Albanian and Macedonian) emerged. Hence, in 1992, the self-proclaimed Republic of Ilirida was declared, and significant conflicts between the Albanian rebels and Macedonian authorities lasted throughout 2001. (Andonovski 2018: 23-49) It ensured the participation of Albanian representatives at all levels of the government in Macedonia. However, neighbouring Albania was more concerned with the question of "consistent implementation of the Ohrid Agreement" in the context of Macedonia's NATO membership. (Blic 2015) Bearing in mind that Albanian political parties play a significant role in the political life of Macedonia, they have succeeded in actual influencing the constitution of power, i.e., the election of dominant Macedonian political options and the formation of the government.
Macedonia recognized Kosovo in the second half of 2008 and succeeded in developing significant forms of bilateral cooperation, mainly economic. In this way, the relations between Macedonian authorities and the Albanian community have been further improved.
Serbia or the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acknowledged Macedonia under its constitutional name as late as 1996, and the period of economic sanctions against the FRY (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) negatively affected the dynamics of mutual economic relations. (Đukanović 2016: 190 
Deceleration of Macedonia's Accession to the EU and NATO after 2005
The persistent insistence of the European Union to overcome bilateral problems in the Western Balkans before it enters the finalization of the accession process has not yielded any meaningful results. This situation blocked Macedonia regarding its relations with the EU. Although Macedonia gained That is why, in this period, Macedonia has gone into a certain self-isolation, lack of understanding of its own foreign and international position and has slipped to authoritarian tendencies and the growth of nationalism. The said situation has also been reflected upon by many international officials. Moreover, Macedonia has long been in the shadow of some other regional issues (such as the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina or the resolution of Kosovo's status). (Torov 2010 ) It also caused Macedonia to step down from the position of "leader" in the entire Western Balkans region in the accession to the European Union and NATO and remain almost on the very margin of these processes.
Due to its stubborn political views and at the same time, avoiding any relevant public debate, the government embodied in VMRO-DPMNE has been trying to block any possible agreement with Greece over the name of the country. The said virtually completely stalled the EU and NATO integration process, but also led to the more visible attachment to some other actors, such as Russia and Turkey. (Nezavisne novine 2017) Moreover, it seemed that Macedonia would only "slip up" deeper in its hard positions towards some neighbours, above all Greece and Bulgaria, which are both the EU and NATO members. All this was followed by the internal re-traditioning of the Macedonian society, the increasing influence of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, and the strengthening of ethnonationalism. Apart from the above-mentioned, the linking of certain continuities of the contemporary Macedonian state and ethnicity with the ancient antique heritage was also historically very questionable. (Stanković 2012) 
Formation of the new Government of Macedonia 2017
The threatened Macedonia to become a self-isolated state and captured into a multitude of open questions with its neighbours. The intense dialogue between the authorities and the opposition concerning the internal political crisis, which Croatian International Relations Review -CIRR -XXV (85) 2019, lasted between 2015 and 2016, resulted in an agreement to hold parliamentary elections in late 2016. (DW 2016) However, these elections also manifested a traditional split between the two dominant options -VMRO-DPMNE and the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM), i.e., their electoral lists and coalitions. VMRO-DPMNE gained a minor advantage with 38.14% of the votes (51 mandates), while the opposition SDSM won near 37% (49 mandates). (N1 2016) The dominant Albanian political parties -the Democratic Union for Integration, the Besa Movement, the Alliance for Albanians, and the Democratic Party of Albanians, together, won 18 mandates.
After the Albanian political parties decided to enter the coalition with the oppositional SDSM, it was clear that the country would plunge into a political crisis. Namely, it lasted 171 days. Significant obstacles to the formation of government were also caused by President Gjorgje Ivanov, who gave his party colleague Grueski a mandate for the composition of the government even though he did not secure a parliamentary majority. (Politika 2018 
The basic principles of the new foreign policy of Macedonia after 2017: highlighted Euro-Atlantic integrations and good neighbourly relations in the Balkans
It is imperative to note the essential characteristics of the new foreign policy of Macedonia after 2017. In the first place, it focused on the prompt resolution of numerous problems with neighbours accumulated over the past years, and above all, those most difficult with Greece and Bulgaria. However, this was a very demanding goal, which proved to be realistic in the first year and half of the new government led by Zoran Zaev. The willingness to get immersed in solving these problems is a fundamental difference to the earlier right-wing governments led by Nikola Gruevski and VMRO-DPMNE. Although he occasionally sent signals, both to the EU and the USA, that he would solve these problems, former Prime Minister Gruevski did not do so primarily because of the resistance of the rightwing part of the Macedonian public.
Macedonia has shown its commitment to good neighbourly relations by taking part in numerous regional initiatives and forums in South East Europe and the Western Balkans. The secretariats of several regional initiatives are located in Skopje (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative -MAARI, South East Europe Health Network -SEE HN, Network of Associations of Local Authorities of South-East Europe -NALAS, etc. (Lopandić, Kronja 2011: 305-320) The second complementary goal was related to the previous full implementation of the first one, which is the acceleration of Euro-Atlantic integration. In that sense, the country's entry into NATO has been unblocked, and soon it is also expected to get a date for the start of negotiations on EU membership 1 . Showing the example of good practice in resolving relations with neighbours has contributed to the alleviation of tensions in the Western Balkans and throughout the Balkan Peninsula. By addressing the name dispute, the new Macedonian authorities have shown how important is good political will and determination of political actors to solve a highly complex and decades-old issue, without adverse effect on the vital interests of the Macedonian people and the citizens of Macedonia.
The complete complementarity of both goals and their implementation has contributed to Macedonia's recognition as a constructive actor in the very turbulent Western Balkans and the equally unstable modern Europe. The significance of nearly three decades of Macedonia's long strategic partnership with the United States should not be underestimated, which contributed primarily to the country's emergence from a specific international (self) isolation, and then a successful After the disclosure of this document, it was clear that a new coalition would be formed in Macedonia, which the ruling VMRO-DPMNE was opposing for more than a decade. Also, the re-affirmation of specific issues concerning the rights of the Albanians has only homogenized nationalistic circles in the ethnic Macedonian corps and provoked a multitude of controversial appearances by then-state officials, as well as numerous tensions.
After the government of Prime Minister Zaev achieved some progress in relations with Bulgaria (2017) (Marlov, Ivanova 2013: 259-264) The new Macedonian Government has intensely supported the process of full normalization of relations between the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina, and it is frequently noted that without resolving this problem, it will not be easy to provide full regional stability. (Večernje novosti 2017) In the following period, Albania will undoubtedly provide added support to Macedonia to join NATO after the implementation of the Prespa Agreement, which can be expected in 2020. However, initiating new issues such as the Macedonian symbols and the like, on the other hand, would not contribute to good relations between the Albanians and Macedonians in this country nor its relations with Albania. However, adoption of the law on the official use of the Albanian language at the state level of Macedonia at the beginning of 2018 confirmed the determination of the ruling SDSM and Prime Minister Zaev to improve relations with the Albanian population in the country.
b) First Significant Progress in Relations with Neighbouring countries -The Treaty between Macedonia and Bulgaria (1 August 2017)
The first noteworthy progress in relations with its neighbours, Macedonia achieved on 1 August 2017, with the signing of the Treaty on friendship, neighbourliness, and cooperation with Bulgaria. (Vlada na Makedonija, 2017) It was significant because of constant identity disputes with Bulgaria and the latent threats that it would use it as a blackmailing potential regarding Macedonia's entry into the EU and NATO. This Treaty indeed represented an increasingly significant improvement in relations between the two countries.
This Treaty remarkably relieved the relations in the southeast of Europe and pointed to the necessity of addressing problems that carry an overly complex historical heritage. (ibid.: preamble) Interestingly, this document did not mention the Bulgarian Former governments dominated by VMRO-DPMNE did not want to accept any change of the name, although the problem was only the "external" use of the state's name, not the change of the constitution and the name for the internal use. With the arrival of the new SDSM-led government, dialogue with the official Athens intensified, which was followed by a specially strengthened role and engagement of the United States. The USA has encouraged both parties to finalise the dialogue, as well as to find the solution as soon as possible. Although there were presented various proposals to be added in front of the name Macedonia such as New/Upper/Vardar/Ilinden, the compromise which was achieved envisaged the name "Republic of North Macedonia". (Danas 2018) The agreement was signed on 17 June 2018 in Prespa, near the Macedonian-Greek border, by the premiers of the two countries and in the presence of many officials. It was based on earlier arrangements, intensification of bilateral cooperation, and the establishment of a strategic partnership between Greece and Macedonia. (Prespa Agreement 2018) The key foundations of the Macedonian national identity were preserved, such as the language for which it was specified that it belonged to the South Slavic group of languages. (ibid.: Article 1, 3b; Article 7,4)
The determinant Macedonian and Macedonian citizenship were also preserved. (ibid.: Article 1, 3b) The first part of this agreement focused precisely on these identity issues, but it also referred to the principles of international law, membership in the United Nations, and good neighbourly relations. (ibid.: Part
One) It has also been indicated the following: both sides would respect the state borders; both sides were against irredentism and secessionism; that they would not mingle in each other's internal affairs; that they were against the use of the heritage of ancient Greek culture from the Macedonian side. (ibid.: Article 4-8) In this regard, a special Commission would be formed, composed of experts in the field of history and education, to address the problems related to conflicting interpretations of history. (ibid.: Article 8, 5)
The second part of the agreement determined a whole spectrum of areas in which the strategic partnership of the two countries would be established. (ibid.: Part Two) Particularly significant was the rise of diplomatic relations between Greece and Macedonia at the level of ambassadors, which was a substitute for the existing liaison offices. (ibid.: Article 10) The agreement has also envisaged the strategic cooperation in international organizations and forums and political cooperation with the formation of a special high-level council to oversee and foster the partnership. (ibid.: Article 11) Boosting economic cooperation as well as "cooperation in the fields of education, science, culture, research, technology, health and sport" were highlighted as priorities of the future strategic partnership between Macedonia and Greece. (ibid.: Article 15) Also, there was the strengthening of interstate defence cooperation as well as cooperation in the field of civil protection. (ibid.: Article 16) Taking everything into account, it was an extensive list of areas for the strategic cooperation and the commitment of Skopje and Athens to enhance previously weak bilateral relations through such intense cooperation.
Based on this agreement, the Government of Macedonia organized a referendum on 30 September 2018, which was not legally binding, but it indeed revealed remarkably interesting mood indicators of the citizens. The majority voted to accept the Treaty (about 95%), but more than half of the total voters It should also be noted the significant escalation of Greek nationalism, which manifested itself through mass protests and opposition to the agreement between Macedonia and Greece. (Garda 2018) Even so, there was still much pressure regarding the implementation of the Prespa Agreement, primarily from the EU and the United States. On 25 January 2019, the Greek Parliament adopted the Prespa Agreement, followed by changes in the Constitution and full implementation of the Prespa Agreement in Macedonia. There was a narrow majority in the Greek Parliament with only 153 votes in favour and 146 against. (Blic, 2019) On the other hand, we need to assess the real capacities and the extent of the announced strategic partnership between Greece and Macedonia. There is a possibility that this partnership might be more symbolic to relax the public of both countries to accept compromises. However, Macedonia received an invitation to join NATO on 12 July 2018, and there is a prospect of opening negotiations with the European Union in the coming year. (Invitation 2018) Thus, this country will escape its earlier 
Conclusion
The new Macedonian government, constituted in 2017, succeeded in overcoming the numerous key bilateral issues with its neighbours just one year after its formation. Moreover, significant efforts have been made primarily for the consolidation of intra-ethnic circumstances between the Macedonians and Albanians, which was also transposed on Macedonia's relations with neighbouring Albania. These relations are now promoted further, and there is no potential for blocking Macedonia's entry into NATO, which has been debated in the official Tirana in previous years. A comparable situation is with Kosovo, with which the previous government had also well-regulated bilateral relations.
Of course, the most significant breakthrough of the new Macedonian Government has been achieved in its relation to Greece, where it has demonstrated a significant degree of compromise even in terms of empathetic identity determinants, to which the name of the country for internal and external use belongs. Also, resetting the relations between Macedonia and Greece after a twenty-seven years-long dispute will undoubtedly contribute to the accelerated dynamics of the Euro-Atlantic integration of this country. It is confirmed by the strategic partnership between the two countries envisaged by the Prespa Agreement in several areas. This case has proven useful for overcoming some other similar issues in the Western Balkans region, especially when it comes to relations between Serbia and Kosovo. ) Furthermore, the determination and courage of the Macedonian political leadership to face the unpopularity of solving the significant problem of the name of the state, and to compromise it with neighbouring Greece should also be emphasized.
Credible public opinion polls showed primarily that the Prespa Agreement did not receive significant support from the Macedonian citizens. (Križalovski 2018) This was proved by a non-binding referendum on the Prespa Agreement, which was held on 30 September 2018, but also numerous researches over the past years. (Klekovski, Mihailovska, Jovanov 2018: 26-42) Bearing in mind that the pre-referendum campaign in Macedonia lasted only three and a half months, one should not be surprised by the inadequate response from the citizens.
Also, considering that the state's name issue represents an essential part of the foundations of the Macedonian national identity, one should not be surprised by a rather unconvincing majority that "copied" to the presidential elections in Macedonia on 5 May 2019. As a result, Stevo Pendarovski, as the candidate of the SDSM and the Albanian Democratic Union for Integration, won 51.6 percent in the second round, and the opposition candidate from VMRO-DPMNE, Gordana Siljanovska Dakova won 44.7 percent. (New Magazine 2019) However, this confirmed that the majority of the citizens after their initial negative attitude towards the Prespa Agreement gradually changed their views by identifying the only realistic option for the country in the policy of a clear Euro-Atlantic commitment, as well as good neighbourly relations in the Balkans.
Noteworthy progress has been made in the second half of 2017 and during 2018 in the relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria. The relations with this country are particularly
